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NOTES
SECTION 20(a) OR RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR?: AN
UPDATE
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' imposes
vicarious liability for securities fraud on controlling persons for the conduct
of controlled actors, unless the controlling persons acted in good faith and
did not induce the controlled actors' conduct. 2 A debate over whether
section 20(a) preempts common law agency theories in actions for securities
fraud exists among the circuit courts.' The federal circuits remain split on
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1982). The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting
depression gave rise to passage of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. H. O.ECK, MODERN CORuoRATIoN LAW § 1577 (1959). The purpose of the 1934
Act is to regulate trading in securities markets and require disclosure of information to persons
involved in the purchase and sale of securities. Id.
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1982) (establishing vicarious liability of controlling persons
for securities fraud). Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that:
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1982).
3. See, e.g., Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that
common law agency is appropriate basis of recovery for federal securities violations); In re
Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that § 20(a) does
not preclude finding of liability based on apparent authority); Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones
& Co., 750 F.2d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that controlling person provisions in federal
statutes supplant use of respondeat superior doctrine). The doctrine of respondeat superior is
a common law theory of vicarious liability that holds a master liable for the torts of a servant
that occur while the servant is acting within the scope of employment. REsTATEmENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). A master is a principal who employs an agent and possesses the
right to control the conduct of the agent. Id. § 2. A servant is an agent whose conduct is
subject to the principal's control. Id. The scope of employment required for respondeat
superior liability involves a servant's conduct that is of the kind that the master has employed
the servant to perform, that occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits, and
that the servant actuates at least in part with a purpose to serve the master. Id. § 228. Once
the prerequisites are met, a principal is liable for the conduct of a servant without a finding
of fault on the part of the principal. W. BuRBY, REFRESHER HANDBOOK ON AGENCY 60 (3d
ed. 1960).
The doctrine of apparent authority holds a principal liable for the conduct of an agent
when the principal holds the agent out as a person who is authorized to act for the principal
and a third party relies on the representation of authority. SEAvE Y, LAw OF AGENCY 13 (1964).
Originally, respondeat superior applied to torts, while apparent authority applied to contracts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958). Modem application, however, involves
overlapping of the doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent authority. Note, Rule 10b-5
- The Equivalent Scope of Liability Under Respondeat Superior and Section 20(a) - Imposing
a Benefit Requirement on Apparent Authority, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1383, 1385 (1982). Unlike
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the issue. 4 Some circuits have held that section 20(a) is not the exclusive
remedy for securities violations.5 The Ninth Circuit, however, maintains
that section 20(a) preempts common law agency principles. 6 The recent
decisions of three federal circuits have fueled the debate surrounding the
exclusivity issue. 7 Despite the variety of responses among the circuits, the
United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the exclusivity of section
20(a). 8
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the exclusivity issue,
commentators offer numerous explanations to support or to refute the
respondeat superior, however, apparent authority may hold a principal liable for the acts of
an agent that are outside the scope of employment and that are effected to further the agent's
self-interest. Id at 1399.
4. See infra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of exclusivity
issue among circuits).
5. See, e.g., Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (adopting use
of common law agency to impose vicarious liability upon principals for securities violations);
In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that apparent
authority is appropriate measure of liability for securities violations); Henricksen v. Henricksen,
640 F.2d 880, 888 (7th Cir.) (holding broker-dealer liable for securities violation under both
§ 20(a) and common law doctrine of respondeat superior), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981);
Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that
§ 20(a) does not supplant or exclude common law agency principles as theory of recovery
under Securities Exchange Act); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 714 (2d
Cir.) (stating that common law agency principles are available to plaintiff in action for
securities violation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690,
696 (6th Cir. 1976) (approving plaintiff's use of apparent authority to hold principal liable for
securities violation); Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975)
(holding that doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable to certain types of securities
violations); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that liability for
securities violations also arises from common law theories of vicarious liability); Kerbs v. Fall
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 741 (10th Cir. 1974) (imposing liability upon principal
through common law agency theory).
6. See, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting use of respondeat superior doctrine in action involving federal securities claim);
Christoffel v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that Ninth
Circuit precedent holds that § 20(a) supplants doctrine of respondeat superior); Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.) (holding that doctrine of respondeat superior is not
available as basis of recovery for federal securities violation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 1967) (applying
§ 20(a) to situation involving federal securities violation), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968),
cert. dismissed 393 U.S. 801 (1969).
7. See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (adopting common
law agency theory of vicarious liability for securities violations); In re Atlantic Fin. Manage-
ment, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986) (approving apparent authority as theory of recovery
for securities violations); Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 777 (9th Cir.
1984) (stating that "controlling person" provision is exclusive source of vicarious liability for
securities violations).
8. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A
Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HorsmxA L. Rav. 1, 1 (1983) (noting absence of Supreme
Court review of exclusivity issue).
SECTION 20(a)
exclusive application of section 20(a) to securities violations.9 Commentators
have examined in detail the legislative history of section 20(a).10 Analysis
of the legislative history of section 20(a), however, is inconclusive on the
question of exclusivity." Congress based section 20(a) on section 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).' 2 Section 15 of the 1933 Act was created
to prevent corporations from avoiding liability by using dummy agents.'
3
Noting the atmosphere of increased securities regulation surrounding the
drafting of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, commentators who support the appli-
cation of common law remedies to securities violations argue that the effect
of section 20(a) is to expand theories of liability to include situations
previously outside the limits of traditional agency theory.' 4 Commentators
who favor applying the common law generally argue that the remedial
nature of section 20(a) supports a theory of expansion of liability, rather
9. See, e. g., Black, Application of Respondeat Superior Principles to Securities Fraud
Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 825 (1984) (discussing relationship between common law remedies and § 20(a));
Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 7 (same); Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and
Section 10(b): In Defense of the Common Law, 50 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 754 (1982) (same);
Note, Third Circuit Adopts Limited Use of Respondeat Superior as Means of Imposing
Secondary Liability Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 238 (1982)
[hereinafter Note, Third Circuit Adopts Limited Use] (same); Note, Rule 10b-5 - The
Equivalent Scope of Liability Under Respondeat Superior and Section 20(a) - Imposing a
Benefit Requirement on Apparent Authority, 35 VAND. L. Rav. 1383 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
lob-5 - The Equivalent Scope] (same); Note, Rule lOb-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on
Respondeat Superior, 69 CALiF. L. R v. 1513 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious
Liability] (same); Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability and Respondeat
Superior: Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 152 (1979)
[hereinafter Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability] (same); Comment, Second-
ary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts: Toward An Improved Analysis,
126 U. PA. L. Rav. 1345 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Secondary Liability] (same); Comment,
Vicarious Liability for Securities Law Violations: Respondeat Superior and the Controlling
Person Sections, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REy. 713 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, Vicarious Liability]
(same).
10. See, e. g., Black, supra note 9, at 841-42 (discussing legislative history of § 20(a));
Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 8, at 22 (same); Note, Third Circuit Adopts Limited Use,
supra note 9, at 261 (same); Comment, Vicarious Liability, supra note 9, at 718 (same).
11. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (stating that commentators argue for and
against exclusivity based on legislative history of section 20(a)).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(o) (1982) (1933 Act holds controlling persons liable to same
extent as controlled actor, provided that controlling person had knowledge of or reason to
believe in existence of facts giving rise to liability); see also Comment, Vicarious Liability,
supra note 9, at 721 (discussing relationship between § 20(a) of 1934 Act and § 15 of 1933
Act).
13. See S. 785, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(k), 4, 13; 77 CONG. REc. 2979-82 (1933)
(discussing purpose behind § 15 of 1933 Act).
14. See Black, supra note 9, at 842 (arguing that purpose of § 20(a) is to extend liability
to persons beyond reach of common law); Note, Vicarious Liability, supra note 9, at 718
(stating that § 20(a) extends liability to situations lacking a master-servant or employer-
employee relationship). Congress' purpose in drafting the Securities Acts, which was to prohibit
1987]
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than a narrowing of available remedies."s Supporters of the availability of
common law remedies also rely on section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, which
states that remedies contained in the Act should be viewed as additions to
remedies previously available.1
6
Rejecting the use of federal statutory remedies as additions to common
law remedies, commentators arguing for exclusive application of section
20(a) contend that Congress, by including the good faith and inducement
defenses in section 20(a), intended to replace common law notions of strict
liability with the limited liability of section 20(a).17 Common law agency
theory imposes liability based on the relationship between a principal and
an agent.' 8 The liability of a principal does not depend on the personal
fault of the principal.' 9 As a result, the use of a strict liability standard
renders useless the defenses available to a principal under section 20(a).
20
Because of the inconsistency between the strict liability standard and the
available defenses under section 20(a), commentators argue that Congress
must have intended section 20(a) to preempt the common law theory.2'
stock market abuses, suggests that the purpose of the "controlling person" provisions is to
expand the ability of investors to hold employers liable for securities violations. Musewicz,
supra note 9, at 791. Congress deliberately failed to define "control" within the statute in an
effort to encompass the broadest range of relationships involving control. Note, Vicarious
Liability, supra note 9, at 718.
15. See Black, supra note 9, at 842 (arguing that remedial nature of Securities Act
supports use of common law theory); Note, Third Circuit Adopts Limited Use, supra note 9,
at 250 (same).
16. See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980) (language
of § 28(a) of 1934 Act supports use of common law remedies). Section 28(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 provides in part that:
... the rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.
15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(b)(a) (1982).
17. See Black, supra note 9, at 841-42 (use of respondeat superior doctrine nullifies good
faith defense in § 20(a)); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 8, at 11 (same); supra note 2 and
accompanying text (section 20(a) allows principals to invoke defenses of good faith and
inducement). Because application of the respondeat superior doctrine in determining an
employer's vicarious liability involves only the question of whether an employee acted within
the scope of employment, consideration of the statutory defenses of good faith and inducement
is irrelevant under common law analysis. Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 9, at 11. Com-
mentators, therefore, argue that by including the statutory defenses in § 20(a), Congress
rejected the use of common law remedies. Black, supra note 9, at 841-42.
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (under common law agency theory, liability
arises from principal-agent relationship).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 229 (1958) (discussing lack of
culpability of principal under doctrine of respondeat superior); see also Comment, Vicarious
Liability, supra note 9, at 714 (discussing standards of principal liability).
20. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 8, at 1-2 (stating that use of common law
agency theory nullifies exculpatory provisions of § 20(a)); Black, supra note 9, at 841-42
(discussing effect of respondeat superior doctrine in nullifying good faith defense in § 20(a)).
21. See supra notes 17 & 20 and accompanying text (commentators urge exclusivity of
§ 20(a) based on congressional intent to provide statutory defenses not available at common
law).
SECTION 20(a)
In addition to analyzing the inconsistency between common law strict
liability and the defenses available under section 20(a), commentators have
examined Supreme Court opinions that address issues closely related to the
exclusivity question. 22 While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of secondary liability, it has turned its attention to questions of primary
liability. 23 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,24 the plaintiffs were customers
of a small brokerage firm. 25 The brokerage firm retained the accounting
firm of Ernst & Ernst to audit periodically the brokerage firm's books. 26
The president and majority shareholder of the brokerage firm had secured
the plaintiffs' investment in a fraudulent scheme. 27 The plaintiffs, upon
discovery of the fraud, filed an action against Ernst & Ernst, charging that
the accounting firm had aided and abetted the brokerage firm's fraudulent
scheme. 2 The plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Ernst was negligent in failing
to use proper auditing procedures that would have revealed the fraudulent
activity within the brokerage firm.29 The Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether negligence was a sufficient basis for a cause of action
under section 10-b of the 1934 Act, or whether section 10-b required a
finding of intentional conduct. 30 The Court analyzed the language and the
legislative history of section 10-b and concluded that section 10-b requires
that conduct constituting a violation must include some element of intent.',
22. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 8, at 14 (discussing recent Supreme Court
decisions rejecting use of respondeat superior doctrine); Musewicz, supra note 9, at 756
(discussing recent Supreme Court cases concluding that Court has not resolved secondary
liability issue).
23. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1983) (holding
that implied remedy under § 10(b) was available for misrepresentations in registration statement
in spite of express statutory remedy); American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570 (1982) (approving apparent authority as appropriate
remedy for antitrust violations); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (extending to
Securities and Exchange Commission actions requirement of intent as element of § 10-b claim).
24. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
25. Id. at 189.
26. Id. at 188. In Hochfelder, Ernst & Ernst, in addition to auditing the brokerage
firm's books, also prepared the firm's annual reports for filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id.
27. Id. at 189. In Hochfelder, the president of the brokerage firm induced the plaintiffs
to invest in escrow accounts, which the broker promised would yield high returns. Id. No
escrow accounts existed, however, and the firm president was converting the money to his
own use. Id.
28. Id. at 189-90.
29. Id. at 190. The plaintiffs in Hochfelder contended that Ernst & Ernst should have
questioned the firm president's rule that only the president was authorized to open mail that
he received at the firm. Id. The existence of the rule should have been reflected in Ernst &
Ernst's reports as preventing an effective audit, thus leading the Securities and Exchange
Commission to investigate the firm. Id.
30. Id. at 195. Section 10-b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits broadly
the use of deception or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
31. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214-15.
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While useful only for purposes of determining the general view of the
Court regarding secondary liability, Hochfelder indicates that the United
States Supreme Court is unwilling to impose primary liability upon principals
without a finding of scienter.12 Proponents of section 20(a) exclusivity argue
that the intent requirement of section 10-b indicates that the Court would
be opposed to the use of common law theories that employ a strict liability
standard and require no finding of fault on the part of the principal.33 A
comparison of the nature of primary liability, which requires a finding of
culpability, with secondary liability weakens the proponents' contention
because secondary liability is distinguished by the absence of a direct fault
requirement.14 Supporters of exclusivity, however, also argue that the Su-
preme Court has rejected a theory of expanding remedies under federal
securities laws based merely on the general remedial purposes of the laws. 5
A United States Supreme Court decision subsequent to Hochfelder
demonstrates the Court's willingness to employ the theory of apparent
authority in cases of secondary liability. 6 In American Society of Mechanical
Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.,37 the Court addressed the liability of an
organization, which promulgates industry safety codes, for antitrust viola-
tions of subcommittee members of the organization .3 The American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) publishes over 400 codes for different
areas of engineering and industry. 39 The codes are advisory only, but have
been incorporated in various federal regulations, state laws, and city ordi-
nances40 Acting as an agent of ASME, a subcommittee of ASME was
32. See id. (holding that scienter is necessary element in lOb-5 suit).
33. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 8, at 26 (contending that recent Supreme
Court decisions indicate that Court favors finding of fault as prerequisite to liability under
securities laws).
34. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597, 600
(1972) (comparing primary and secondary liability of principals for securities violations).
Principals who owe a direct duty to injured parties are primarily liable for violations of the
duty. Id. at 604. A principal is primarily liable for recklessly giving orders to employees,
recklessly hiring employees, or for failing to perform a non-delegable duty. Id. Secondary
liability, conversely, is liability of a principal that arises because an agent has violated the law.
Id. at 600. Secondary liability involves the liability of a principal for the acts of agents in the
absence of a principal's direct participation in the prohibited conduct. Id. at 604.
35. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (stating that
remedial purpose of 1934 Securities Act does not justify reading provision of Act more broadly
than language and statutory scheme permit); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 8, at 26 (arguing
that Supreme Court would be unwilling to accept use of common law remedies solely because
of remedial nature of securities laws).
36. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559
(1982) (applying doctrine of apparent authority to vicarious liability claim under federal antitrust
law).
37. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 559
40. Id.
SECTION 20(a)
responsible for issuing the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code), and for
responding to specific public inquiries about the standards set in the Code.
4'
One company, McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M & M), had dominated the
market for safety devices used in water boilers.4 2 A competitor, Hydrolevel
Corp., however, had developed a different model of the device and had
attracted some of M & M's previous customers4 3 The vice-president of M
& M also occupied the position of vice-chairman of the Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code subcommittee and used his influence to have the subcommittee
determine that Hydrolevel's new device did not meet safety standards."4
Upon discovery of the subcommittee's actions, Hydrolevel filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
alleging antitrust violations4 5 At trial, Hydrolevel requested a jury instruc-
tion stating that ASME was liable for the conduct of its agent subcommittee
if the subcommittee was acting within the scope of its apparent authority.46
The district court, however, held that ASME was liable only if ASME had
ratified the agent's conduct or if the agent had acted to further the interests
of ASME. 41 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that ASME was liable if the agent had acted within the scope
of the agent's apparent authority." On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion that
the principles of agency law promoted the purposes of antitrust law, and thus
apparent authority was available to hold ASME vicariously liable for the
acts of the subcommittee. 9 The Court held that the subcommittee possessed
the apparent authority to make representations because the business of the
organization would be ineffective if industry could not rely on the subcom-
mittee's codes."' In adopting the apparent authority theory, the Court
reasoned that application of the principle of apparent authority was con-
sistent with the remedial purpose of the antitrust laws." The Court further
stated that apparent authority is an accepted principle in the federal judicial
system.' 2 While Hydrolevel addresses antitrust violations rather than secu-
rities violations, the Court, after applying the principle of apparent author-
41. Id. at 560.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 560-61.
45. Id. at 564.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 124-27
(2d Cir. 1980) (approving use of apparent authority as source of vicarious liability for federal
antitrust violation).
49. 456 U.S. at 567.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 570.
52. Id. at 567.
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ity, noted and approved decisions that imposed liability for securities
violations .
53
In addition to citing Supreme Court decisions that lend support to the
use of common law remedies for securities violations, supporters of common
law remedies argue that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
stated consistently that it supports the use of common law remedies.5 4 While
the SEC's position is influential, SEC rulings are not controlling in the
federal courts.55 The SEC, however, continues to use the common law in
its proceedings, and continues to urge the federal courts to allow plaintiffs
to recover under the common law.
56
Against the background of intense yet inconclusive analysis of the
exclusivity of section 20(a), three federal circuits recently have decided cases
involving apparent authority. 7 While the decisions do not resolve the
dilemma of exclusivity, the decisions represent an initial step toward uni-
formity.58 In Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,19 the Ninth Circuit
maintained its position as the sole circuit favoring the exclusive application
of section 20(a). 60 Hatrock involved a claim by customers of a brokerage
firm against the firm and a broker-agent for misrepresentation and churn-
ing. 61 The plaintiffs were a young couple with little experience in the
securities market.62 The broker-agent induced the plaintiffs to buy and sell
stocks by making representations that the broker had received information
on the market from an inside source.63 The plaintiffs filed suit in the United
53. Id. at 568; see Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976) (approving
apparent authority as basis of recovery for securities violations); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus.,
Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 741 (10th Cir. 1974) (imposing liability upon principal for securities
violation through common law agency theory).
54. See Comment, Vicarious Liability, supra note 9, at 722 n.51 (discussing SEC's
continued use of respondeat superior doctrine in cases involving vicarious liability for securities
violations).
55. See id. (stating that SEC's position on use of respondeat superior doctrine is not
binding on courts).
56. See Note, Third Circuit Adopts Limited Use, supra note 9, at 251 n.86 (discussing
SEC's application of respondeat superior doctrine to securities violations).
57. See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (approving use of
apparent authority as source of vicarious liability for securities violation); In re Atlantic Fin.
Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (Ist Cir. 1986) (same); Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones &
Co., 750 F.2d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting use of all common law theories of vicarious
liability for securities violations); see also infra notes 130-46 and accompanying text (analyzing
effect of recent federal circuit court cases decided under theory of apparent authority).
58. See infra notes 130-46 and accompanying text (discussing effect of In re Atlantic,
Commerford, and Hatrock decisions).
59. 750 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984).
60. See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1322 (8th Cir. 1986) (identifying Ninth
Circuit as sole circuit adopting exclusive use of § 20(a)).
61. Hatrock, 750 F.2d at 770. Churning occurs when a broker initiates excessive trading
of a customer's securities for the broker's personal gain. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 220 (5th
ed. 1979).
62. Hatrock, 750 F.2d at 770.
63. Id.
SECTION 20(a)
States District Court for the District of Idaho seeking recovery under federal
and state securities laws as well as the state common law of fraud and
misrepresentation. 64 The district court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory
and punitive damages, but denied the plaintiffs attorney's fees. 65
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the award of punitive damages based on the state common law
claim." The Ninth Circuit also upheld the award of compensatory damages.
67
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the common
law theory of respondeat superior allowed the plaintiffs to collect attorney's
fees incurred in pursuit of the federal securities claims. 68 In deciding the
case, the Ninth Circuit did not examine the issue of section 20(a) exclusivity,
but rather stated without additional comment that long-standing precedent
in the Ninth Circuit prohibited the use of common law remedies.
69
The persuasiveness of the Ninth Circuit prohibition against the use of
common law remedies weakens upon examination of the prior Ninth Circuit
cases.7 0 In Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,71 the Ninth Circuit
did not analyze expressly the exclusivity issue, but rather stated that the
principal was liable under neither traditional agency principles nor "con-
trolling person" statutes. 72 Kamen involved two employees of a securities
firm who headed the firm's broker-dealer division. 73 The employees had
developed a fraudulent scheme, the purpose of which allegedly was to
increase the firm's profits.74 The employees would contact over-the-counter
broker-dealers and request that the over-the-counter dealers direct listed
stock transactions toward the Kamen firm. 75 In exchange, Kamen would
channel its unlisted business to the over-the-counter firms. 76 The employees
facilitated the scheme by creating a valueless stock in which to trade.77 The
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 771.
67. Id. at 774.
68. Id. at 777.
69. Id.; see Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 1967)
(Ninth Circuit rejects use of ostensible authority as basis of remedy for securities violation);
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (Ninth Circuit relies on Kamen decision to
prohibit use of common law remedies for securities violations).
70. See In re Atlantic, 784 F.2d at 34 (discussing weaknesses of Ninth Circuit precedent
regarding exclusivity issue); infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (same).
71. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967).
72. Id. at 696; see supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text (discussing common law
agency principles and "controlling person" statutes).
73. Kamen, 382 F.2d at 691.
74. Id. at 692.
75. Id. Rules of various stock exchanges require generally that stocks listed on a certain
exchange be purchased only by members of that exchange. Id. at 691 n.2.
76. Id.
77. Id. In Kamen, the employees would contact one broker-dealer and request that he
purchase the valueless shares from a second broker-dealer and in turn sell the shares to a third
broker-dealer at a slightly higher price. Id. The employees thus developed a chain of sales at
increasing prices. Id.
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plaintiff, an over-the-counter firm, brought suit against the employer under
both section 20(a) and common law agency principles.78 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of California found the employer
liable on a theory of ostensible authority and awarded damages to the
plaintiff. 79 The trial court found the existence of an agency relationship
between the employer and employees based on the employment relationship
and the employees' status as managers of the broker-dealer division. 0 The
Kamen court determined that the employees had actual authority to solicit
transactions involving listed stocks and had ostensible authority to make
representations and to carry out the listed transactions.8 The district court
also found that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the ostensible authority
of the employees.82 The defendant appealed the district court's final judg-
ment.83
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiff's reliance upon the alleged authority of the em-
ployees was unreasonable in light of the plaintiff's experience in and
knowledge of the securities field.8 4 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found
no ostensible authority, and thus the plaintiff could not recover under
agency principles.8 5 The Kamen court further exonerated the employer of
liability under section 20(a) because the employer acted in good faith and
did not induce the employees' conduct.16
In a decision subsequent to Kamen, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Kamen
rule that section 20(a) is the proper standard for determining a principal's
liability for federal securities violations."' In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,88 the
plaintiffs brought suit against a newspaper publisher for the misrepresen-
tations of a reporter in his financial column.89 The court rejected the use
of the respondeat superior doctrine based on the precedent that Kamen had
set. 9° The Zweig court, however, after stating that the "controlling person"
remedy in section 20(a) is the only source of employer liability for securities
78. Id. at 693.
79. Id. The Kamen court uses the term ostensible authority, which is synonymous with
apparent authority. Id. at 695.
80. Id. at 693.
81. Id. at 693-94.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 690.
84. Id. at 696. The Kamen court stated that the fraudulent transactions were sufficiently
unusual in the securities market to put the plaintiff on notice that an inquiry into the agents'
authority might be warranted. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 697.
87. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting Kamen
rule that § 20(a) supplants common law vicarious liability).
88. 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 1131. In Zweig, the financial reporter wrote an article that falsely painted an
attractive financial picture of a company in which the reporter owned stock. Id. When the
price of the company's stock rose as a result, the reporter sold his stock at a profit. Id.
90. Id. at 1132-33.
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violations, found the newspaper publisher to be a controlling person, but
recognized that the newspaper publisher could not be held to a broker-
dealer standard that required the employer to maintain and enforce a
reasonable and proper system of control over employees. 91
The lack of apparent authority in Kamen and the lowered standard of
control in Zweig constitute factual differences that weaken the foundation
of the Ninth Circuit's blanket rejection of common law remedies. 92 The
Ninth Circuit's use of cases lacking true apparent authority characteristics
to establish precedent on the issue of the exclusivity of section 20(a) explains
the Ninth Circuit's position as the single jurisdiction favoring total exclu-
sivity of section 20(a). 93
Unlike the Ninth Circuit decisions in Kamen and Zweig, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Commerford v. Olson,'
4
affirmed the use of common law theory in circumstances that involved
apparent authority.95 In Commerford, the plaintiff had agreed to invest her
money on the advice of a bond salesman in the employ of defendant bond
firm.96 The plaintiff had sent several checks to the salesman. 97 In return,
the salesman sent the plaintiff infrequent and irregular payments allegedly
representing interest income. 98 Rather than investing the plaintiff's money,
the salesman had been converting the money to his personal use. 99
The salesman was on an extended leave of absence from the defendant
91. Id. at 1134-35.
92. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text (demonstrating that failure of Ninth
Circuit to engage in apparent authority analysis is due to existence of factual situations not
supporting apparent authority relationships).
93. See Christoffel v. E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978)
(adopting Ninth Circuit precedent that states that § 20(a) is exclusive remedy for
securities violations). In Christoffel, an account executive for a brokerage firm assumed a
position as guardian for an investor who had become incompetent. Id. at 666. The employee
converted the investor's funds to his own use. Id. at 667. The investor's subsequent guardian
brought an action against the brokerage firm based on the employment relationship that existed
during the guardianship. Id. Relying on precedent, the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of
common law theories and also found that the brokerage firm was not a controlling person
under § 20(a) because the firm did not participate in the employee's guardian activities. Id. at
669; see Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 696 (Ninth Circuits rejects
ostensible authority as basis of remedy for securities violation); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521
F.2d 1129, 1132 (Ninth Circuit prohibits use of common law remedies for securities violations);
see also supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text (circumstances in Ninth Circuit decisions
did not indicate existence of apparent authority).
94. 794 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 1323.
96. Id. at 1320. In Commerford, plaintiff was a retired librarian investing the proceeds
from the sale of her house. Id. The salesman was the plaintiff's nephew. Id. The plaintiff,
having no experience in the securities market, relied on her nephew's advice. Id.
97. Id. at 1321. In Commerford, the plaintiff made her checks payable to the salesman
personally. Id.
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brokerage firm during the time of the fraudulent activity.'00 The plaintiff
attempted to reach the salesman at the defendant's office during this period,
but the defendant told the plaintiff that the salesman was on a leave of
absence.' 01 The defendant brokerage firm did not know of the salesman's
fraud.'1 Similarly, the plaintiff did not know that securities industry regu-
lations prohibit employees on a leave of absence from conducting lawful
securities transactions. 103
The plaintiff filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota, alleging violations of state and federal securities laws,
as well as common law fraud, breach of contract, and vicarious liability.10
4
The district court entered judgment in favor of the bond firm. 05 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court, holding that common law apparent authority is a basis for
recovery for securities violations.'01
In holding that section 20(a) does not preempt apparent authority as
an available basis of recovery for securities violations, the Eighth Circuit
recognized the split among the circuits on the issue of applicability of
common law agency principles to securities violations. 0 7 The court then
aligned itself with the circuits that allow the use of agency remedies. 08 The
court reasoned that the purpose of section 20(a) was not to narrow existing
remedies. ' 9 Supporting its statement, the court offered the language of
section 28(a) that the rights and remedies of the 1934 Act are in addition
to existing rights and remedies as evidence that section 20(a) operates to
expand available remedies." 0 The Eighth Circuit, however, limited its deci-
sion to cases involving actual or apparent authority."' Under the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning, the scope of a principal's vicarious liability is limited
to either a grant of actual authority or a principal's act of holding out an
agent as a party that is authorized to act for the principal." 2 Both actual
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. During the salesman's leave of absence, the defendant brokerage firm in Com-
merford discovered that the salesman had converted to his own use investment funds received
from his in-laws in a separate transaction. Id. The firm terminated the salesman's employment
and cancelled his license to sell bonds. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1320.
106. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Commerford held that the district court's failure to submit
a special verdict on apparent authority was in error and remanded the case for a new trial.
Id. at 1324.
107. Id. at 1322; see supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing split among
circuits on exclusivity issue).
108. Commerford, 794 F.2d at 1323; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing
circuits that allow use of agency remedies).
109. Commerford, 794 F.2d at 1323.
110. Id.; see supra note 16 (discussing provisions of § 28(a) of 1934 Act).
111. Commerford, 794 F.2d at 1323.
112. Id.
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and apparent authority require some action of a principal."1 The Eighth
Circuit's approval of apparent authority, thus, does not subject a principal
to strict liability for the acts of an agent.
114
In approving the use of apparent authority as the basis of a remedy
for securities violations, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reached a decision similar to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Com-
merford."5 In In re Atlantic Financial Management, Inc.," 6 the plaintiffs
had alleged that the defendant corporation's chairman had misrepresented
facts about the corporation." 7 The misrepresentation had induced plaintiffs
to purchase stock in the corporation and, when stock prices fell, caused
plaintiffs to suffer a loss."' Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts." 9 The district court found
that the "controlling person" section of the 1934 Act did not preclude use
of apparent authority. 20 In affirming the district court's decision, the First
Circuit confronted the critical issue of whether section 20(a) is the exclusive
remedy for securities violations.'
2'
In addressing the exclusivity question, the First Circuit analyzed different
agency relationships including actual authority, apparent authority, and
inherent authority. 22 The First Circuit characterized the circumstances in
question, involving a high-ranking corporate officer, as falling within the
apparent authority category.' 21 In determining that section 20(a) is not an
exclusive remedy, the court effected its own analysis of the legislative history
of section 20(a) and concluded that the purpose of the section is to expand
rather than restrict liability for violations of federal securities laws.124 In a
narrow holding, the court approved the applicability only of the principle
of apparent authority as a basis of recovery for securities violations. 2' In
113. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing action required of principal in
situations involving apparent authority).
114. See Commerford, 794 F.2d at 1323 (premising liability of principal upon proof of
actual or apparent authority).
115. See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that apparent
authority is appropriate remedy for securities violations); In re Atlantic Fin. Management,
Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986) (same).
116. 784 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1986).
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 29.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 31-32.
122. Id. at 32. The Atlantic court discussed three types of agency relationships. Id. A
principal actually may authorize an agent to act. Id. Actual authority may be either express
or implied. Id. Secondly, apparent authority exists when an agent appears to third parties to
possess authority. Id. A principal may also be liable to third parties based on the authority
that the agent appears to possess by reason of the agent's position, which is known as inherent
authority. Id.
123. Id. at 33.
124. Id. at 35; see supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history
of § 20(a)).
125. See In re Atlantic, 784 F.2d at 35 (limiting holding to circumstances involving
apparent authority).
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explaining the narrow scope of its ruling, the First Circuit stated that the
use of common law theory in conjunction with federal statutes depends on
the common law's consistency with the language of the federal statute and
with the purpose underlying the statute. 26 According to the First Circuit,
the use of agency law is thus appropriate only when agency law promotes
the purposes of the securities laws.'Z2 In adopting the principle of apparent
authority, the First Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Cor-
poration, which approved apparent authority as the basis of a claim under
federal antitrust law. 28 Like In re Atlantic, Hydrolevel involved the use of
common law apparent authority as a basis for imposing liability upon a
principal for a federal statutory violation.'
29
The decisions of the First Circuit in In re Atlantic and the Eighth
Circuit in Commerford allow a recovery based on common law agency only
in situations involving apparent authority. 30 The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Hatrock rejects common law agency theory based on precedent that lacks
a factual basis for finding an apparent authority relationship.' 3' While
Commerford, In re Atlantic, and Hatrock do not settle completely the
confusion surrounding the exclusivity issue, the decisions represent an ex-
planation of the existing conflict between circuits and the beginning of a
judicial effort to adopt a compromise position. 32 The decisions do not
embrace totally the concept of recovery based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 33 The doctrine of respondeat superior requires only that an em-
ployee act within the scope of employment to subject a principal to liability
for actions of the employee.' 34 Unlike courts that apply the respondeat
superior doctrine, the courts in In re Atlantic and Commerford adopt the
principle of apparent authority.' 35 Apparent authority requires that the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 31; see supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text (discussing Hydrolevel
decision).
129. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567
(1982) (Supreme Court holds that apparent authority is appropriate basis for imposing vicarious
liability on principal for federal antitrust violations).
130. See supra notes 94-128 and accompanying text (discussing In re Atlantic and Com-
merford decisions, which were based on circumstances involving apparent authority).
131. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text (arguing that Ninth Circuit precedent
rejects use of apparent authority doctrine based on cases the facts of which lack elements of
apparent authority).
132. See infra notes 133-46 and accompanying text (arguing that In re Atlantic and
Commerford decisions represent move toward uniformity among circuits on exclusivity issue).
133. See supra notes 111-14 & 125-28 and accompanying text (stating that First and Eighth
Circuit holdings are limited to circumstances involving actual and apparent authority).
134. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing elements of respondeat superior
doctrine).
135. See supra notes 111-14 & 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing First and Eighth
Circuit recognition of apparent authority in cases involving vicarious liability for securities
violations).
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principal hold the agent out to third parties as one authorized to act for
the principal and further requires that the third party actually rely on the
representation.'6 The In re Atlantic and Commerford decisions represent a
judicial determination to adhere to common law recovery and simultaneously
retreat from common law strict liability.
3 7
By requiring a principal's holding out of an agent's authority, together
with a third party's reliance on the representation of authority, the appli-
cation of apparent authority as a basis of recovery for securities violations
provides some protection of principals against unlimited liability for the
acts of employees. 38 The First and Eighth Circuits, in adopting the apparent
authority principle as a basis of recovery, have attempted to strike a balance
between completely abandoning long-standing common law bases of liability
and holding principals strictly liable for the acts of employees. 39 Judicial
approval of apparent authority as a source of a principal's vicarious liability
combines the underlying policies of both common law agency and section
20(a).' 40 The common law doctrine of respondeat superior allows plaintiffs
greater recovery by holding principals strictly liable for the conduct of a
principal's agents.' 4' Conversely, section 20(a) severely restricts the ability
of plaintiffs to recover against principals by offering principals the broad
defenses of good faith and lack of inducement. 42 The apparent authority
principle occupies a middle ground between the doctrine of respondeat
superior and section 20(a). 43 The theory of apparent authority protects the
principal by requiring a representation of authority by the principal, yet the
protection of the principal under the apparent authority theory is not as
broad as that of section 20(a), which offers the good faith and lack of
inducement defenses.1'4 The principle of apparent authority, therefore, al-
lows plaintiffs greater recovery than does section 20(a), but also offers
136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of apparent
authority).
137. See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that actual
and apparent authority give rise to liability of principal in securities violation claim); In re
Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that apparent
authority is proper basis of remedy for securities violations); see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussing common law agency principles).
138. See Paul F. Newton v. Texas Commerce, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating
that use of actual or apparent authority restricts scope of principal's vicarious liability).
139. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing effect of In re Atlantic
and Commerford decisions).
140. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (discussing effect of use of apparent
authority as basis of recovery for securities violations).
141. See supra note 3 (stating that liability under respondeat superior doctrine requires
no fault on part of principal).
142. See supra note 2 (stating that § 20(a) includes broad defenses of good faith and
inducement).
143. See supra note 3 (discussing reqiurements of apparent authority principle).
144. See id. (comparing elements of apparent authority doctrine and § 20(a)).
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principals greater protection than does the doctrine of respondeat superior . 4
The compromise position that the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and First Circuit have adopted is an initial effort to create
a flexible and workable solution to the dilemma of determining a plaintiff's
proper basis of recovery for federal securities violations.
46
STACY D. BLANK
145. See supra notes 2 & 3 (describing defenses in § 20(a) and elements of apparent
authority principle and respondeat superior doctrine).
146. See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that apparent
authority is appropriate basis of recovery for securities violation); In re Atlantic Fin. Man-
agement, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that vicarious liability for securities
violation is properly based upon apparent authority).
